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Experiments
ABSTRACT:
In the analysis of experimental data, randomization checks, also known as balance
tests, are used to indicate whether a randomization has produced balance on various
characteristics across experimental conditions. Randomization checks are popular in
many fields although their merits have yet to be established. The grounds on which
balance tests are generally justified include either 1) the credibility of experimental
findings, and/or 2) the efficiency of the statistical model. We show that balance tests
cannot improve either credibility or efficiency. The most common “remedy” resulting
from a failed balance test is the inclusion as a covariate of a variable failing the test;
this practice cannot improve the choice of statistical model. Other commonly sug-
gested responses to failed balance tests such as post-stratification or re-randomization
also fail to improve on methods that do not require balance tests. We advocate re-
sisting reviewer requests for randomization checks in all but some narrowly defined
circumstances.
Keywords: balance test, control, covariate, estimator, regression, variance
When executing experimental designs, it has become common practice to run
randomization checks or balance tests as part of the analysis of results1. The exact
origins of this practice are unclear, but such tests are nonetheless widespread. As we
will argue, they are often motivated by faulty assumptions. It would be one thing if
they were harmless, but unnecessary excesses. Unfortunately, these practices often
lead to inferior model choices in the analysis of findings and unjustified interpretations
of findings. For these reasons, we discourage their use except under highly specific
circumstances.
To establish the parameters of our argument, we begin by specifying some circum-
stances under which balance tests make sense. The remainder of the paper details the
problems caused by the use of balance tests in all other cases. We address the argu-
ment that the credibility of experimental findings is enhanced by the use of balance
tests. Next we show why failed balance tests do not tell us anything that can improve
the efficiency of model choice when analyzing experimental results. In addition to
the lack of benefits from balance testing, there is a downside. In the final section
we discuss potential negative effects of balance testing on both the credibility and
efficiency of experimental findings. We conclude with speculation on the origins of
this problematic practice.
Scope
Our argument against the use of balance tests includes the majority of ways in which
they are used in political science experiments. It does not, however, condemn all
1We use the terms “randomization check” and “balance test” interchangeably throughout the
paper.
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possible uses of these tests. When referring to “experiments” we assume 1) that
the researcher has control over assignment to experimental conditions and can ensure
exposure to treatment, and 2) that respondents do not undergo attrition differentially
as a result of assignment to a specific experimental condition. If either of these
conditions is not met, then a balance test may be warranted. For example, in a
laboratory study, if some kinds of respondents were more likely to drop out of an
experiment in progress after exposure to an unpleasant experimental treatment, then
there would be good reason for concern about the comparability of treatment and
control groups. It is important to note that attrition itself is not a concern and occurs
in all kind of studies, experimental and otherwise. In order to be problematic, the non-
equivalence across groups must result from an interaction between the treatment to
which the respondent is assigned in combination with characteristics of the individual
subject. For many types of experimental designs, this is not a serious concern.
If experiments are well designed, that is, if protocols are designed so that no
experimental condition is shorter or longer than any other, or more or less likely
to retain respondents than any other, then randomization accomplishes its mission.
Regardless of whether it is executed using a random number table, using computer-
generated random numbers such as those generated by Excel, or via programming
code as is common in online experiments, the investigator should have the information
necessary to assess threats to the randomization procedure without ever looking at
the results of the study.
Similar considerations arise in field experiments. If researchers assign some homes
to receive treatments (such as campaign brochures) but the researchers cannot ensure
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that respondents in the home are actually exposed to the experimental treatment,
then it is possible that more politically interested respondents would be more exposed
than the politically uninterested. If the researcher compares the groups based on
intent to treat rather than on actual treatment, statistical comparisons will be valid
(although effect sizes will be underestimated). But if the researcher compares those
who actually looked at the brochure to a control group, then there are obvious reasons
for concern about balance. In summary, balance tests serve a useful purpose when
assessing threats to the execution of the randomization protocol.
Aside from differential exposure or noncompliance, the only additional scenario
in which a randomization check makes sense is when the randomization mechanism
itself may not be working properly. As noted in Bowers (2009, Section 4.1.1), prior
works that are critical of the practice of balance testing (Senn, 1994; Imai et al.,
2008) specifically exclude cases where the mechanism may be faulty. While cases of
faulty programming such as in the 1997 National Election Study may be rare, there
are other examples in which faulty assumptions lead to randomization failures. For
example, experiments in which randomization at the individual level is only approx-
imate because the treatment is implemented at a different level of analysis can lead
to problems (see Imai 2005; Gerber and Green 2000; Hansen and Bowers 2008).
With the exceptions noted above, randomization checks lead researchers down a
misguided and fruitless path. They are irrelevant to the credibility of experimental
results and have no capacity to improve efficiency. Testing for demographic or other
differences between experimental groups is misguided because a lack of differences on
whatever variables happen to have been tested does not mean it was “successful” any
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more than finding a difference means that it was a “failure”.
Credibility of Experimental Findings
Reviewers of experimental studies routinely request that authors provide random-
ization checks, that is, statistical tests designed to substantiate the equivalence of
experimental conditions on one or more factors measured before treatment. The
logic behind such requests is to examine whether random assignment to experimen-
tal conditions has “succeeded” in producing comparable experimental conditions on
characteristics measured before the experimental treatment was administered. But
what exactly does it mean for a randomization to “succeed”? The purpose of such
tests is to reassure readers that they can trust the internal validity of a given exper-
iment’s results. Researchers compare experimental groups on variables that are not
part of the central theoretical framework of the study. Often these are demographics,
but frequently they include other variables as well.
The point of this exercise is not to test whether there is an error in the mechanism
for random assignment. Instead, it is to convince one’s audience that this particular
randomization did not happen to be one of those “unlucky” draws wherein some mea-
sured variable is unequal across conditions. By comparing means across conditions
for one or more variables, the investigator supports his or her assertion about the
pre-treatment equivalence of experimental groups.
Unfortunately, this practice and the conclusions drawn from it are problematic.
There is a temptation to run comparisons on a large number or at least a handful of
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auxiliary variables, just to see if anything comes up significant. This is a statistically
misguided idea in several respects. The problem is not so much the number of com-
parisons as the logical basis for doing them to begin with. The use of randomization
checks for this purpose demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of what ran-
dom assignment does and does not accomplish. A well-executed random assignment
to experimental conditions does not promise to make experimental groups equal on all
possible dimensions or on any one characteristic, or even a specified subset of them.
Across many independent randomizations this is very likely to be the case, but not
for any given randomization.
Doesn’t this lack of across-the-board equivalence pose problems for drawing strong
causal inferences? Contrary to popular belief, it does not. This idea was the single
fundamental scientific contribution of R. A. Fisher. It is not necessary for experi-
mental conditions to be identical in all possible respects (Thye, 2007). Psychologist
Robert Abelson (Abelson, 1995) dubs the practice of testing for differences between
experimental groups a “silly significance test.” As he explains, “Because the null
hypothesis here is that the samples were randomly drawn from the same popula-
tion, it is true by definition, and needs no data.” Senn (1994, p. 1716) likewise
calls the practice of performing randomization tests “philosophically unsound, of no
practical value, and potentially misleading.” In the context of political science, Imai
et al. (2008) echo this sentiment, “Any other purpose [than to test the randomization
mechanism] for conducting such a test is fallacious,” and they go on to cite works in
respected journals in economics, political science, sociology, psychology, education,
management science, medicine, public health and statistics which succumb to this
fallacy. A number of others have put forth some of the same arguments (Altman,
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1985; Permutt, 1990). Even those in favor of balance testing in some circumstances
(Begg, 1990) deplore the arbitrary and misleading practice of testing for significance
as a means of implementing balance tests.
But then what should one conclude if one finds a pre-treatment difference in some
characteristic that might be relevant to the outcome of the experiment? Does that
mean that the randomization essentially “failed”? When findings indicate no sig-
nificant differences on the variables chosen for balance tests, the randomizations are
claimed to be “successful,” so this inference seems logical. But both assertions would
be wrong or, at the very least, misguided. Assuming there is no technical problem in
the software that does random assignment, no errors in the random number table that
is used by the research assistant, or some other concrete procedural glitch, random
assignment is successful by definition, so long as it is executed correctly. Our point is
not that random assignment always functions to make groups perfectly comparable
(because this is demonstrably not the case). But perfect comparability is not neces-
sary, and a lack of it is not a legitimate justification for conducting randomization
checks, particularly given that the statistical significance attached to such a test is
not meaningful.
Of course, if one does enough comparisons, one is bound to find a significant dif-
ference on one of them by chance alone. Some scholars have suggested procedures
for combining multiple tests into one grand test (Bowers, 2009; Hansen and Bowers,
2008), thereby avoiding this problem. These procedures solve the problem of conduct-
ing too many tests, but they miss the larger point: statistical tests used to analyze
experiments already take the possibility of nonequivalent conditions into account. Al-
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though it is true that one can never totally eliminate the possibility of differences in
experimental group composition, that probability has already been incorporated into
the statistical tests used to test the null hypothesis of no difference between exper-
imental groups. To reiterate, the infamous “p < .05” that tests the null hypothesis
already includes the probability that randomization might have produced an unlikely
result, even before the treatment was administered. So, while there is no guarantee
of avoiding an unlikely fluke result (short of replication, which should happen in any
case), by conducting the standard test and reporting it correctly, researchers have
already done due diligence.
Thus far the points we have made are not original; they have been made by
others from time to time in the statistical literature, although they have been largely
ignored in practice. Instead, the contrary view, that balance tests are essential to the
credibility of findings, persists. For example, as Hansen and Bowers (2008, page 13)
suggest, “Comparative studies typically present a small number of covariates that
must be balanced in order for the study to be convincing, along with a longer list of
variables on which balance would be advantageous.” In purely experimental studies,
a simple hypothesis test with, say, p < 0.001 should be considered very convincing
without a balance test2.
2Those who consider balance essential might consider sequential randomization procedures such
as those in (Pocock et al., 2002) which produce a blocking-type balance but over many variables
simultaenously.
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Efficiency of Statistical Models
If credibility is not a compelling reason to execute balance checks, a second possibil-
ity is that balance checks are useful for gaining efficiency in experimental analyses.
Knowledge of an imbalance on some variables may promote efficiency if the analysis
takes this knowledge into account. This might be accomplished by the addition of co-
variates, by post-stratification or by rejecting the randomization and re-randomizing.
We consider each of these possibilities in turn.
Covariates
The inclusion of covariates is well known to improve efficiency so long as the covariates
predict variance in the dependent variable. In fact, one may compute a threshold: an
amount of variance in the dependent variable that a covariate must predict in order
for its inclusion in the model to yield an increase, rather than a decrease, in efficiency.
This threshold, in less precise language, has appeared elsewhere (e.g., Franklin 1991).
The reasons behind this are quite intuitive. The data is the sum of a signal and some
noise. An experimental effect can be detected only if the signal is stronger than the
noise. Subtracting some of the noise that is present makes the signal more visible.
On the other hand, adding or subtracting new noise only obscures the signal
further. Adjusting for a covariate subtracts a linear estimate of the portion of the
noise due to the covariate. What is subtracted is therefore some portion of the noise
due to this covariate. But there is new noise introduced as well, namely the noise in
the linear estimate. A covariate improves efficiency only if it subtracts more old noise
8
than new noise. If the new noise is held fixed, one sees a threshold in the amount
of old noise that must be subtracted in order to produce a gain in efficiency. In the
limiting case, when the covariate does not explain variance in the dependent variable,
there is no old noise and the effect of linear adjustment is entirely the introduction
of new noise.
Given these considerations, are covariates an appropriate response to failed bal-
ance tests? Covariates should be selected because they are expected to explain vari-
ance in the dependent variable, whereas a failed balance tests indicate a relationship
between the covariate and the independent variable. To date, a glance through the
literature reveals considerable divergence of opinion on the issue of “correcting” for
imbalance in experimental designs. There is a mathematical result, a version of which
is proved in Feldstein (1973) but which appears in other places (e.g., Franklin 1991),
which should put to rest the issue of whether a balance test can help to identify a
covariate whose inclusion in the model would be advantageous.
Let t denote the threshold for the fraction of the variance of the depen-
dent variable that the covariate must predict in order that including the
covariate increases efficiency rather than decreasing it. Then, conditional
on the values of the covariate, the proportion t is an increasing function
of r2, the squared empirical correlation between the covariate and the
independent variable.
One may interpret this as follows. We have a number of potential covariates measured
prior to the experimental treatment. In deciding which to include in the analysis we
have the option to see whether the randomization distributes the values of these
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covariates evenly among the treatment and control groups. We may decide, for ex-
ample, to include only those covariates for which there is a significant imbalance.
Alternatively, we may include only those covariates known from previous research or
suspected for theoretical reasons to be strong predictors of the dependent variable.
A third strategy would combine these: including known predictors of the outcome
together with any other measured covariates that happen to be assigned to treatment
groups in an imbalanced way.
The above result tells researchers to follow the second strategy. When a covariate
fails a randomization test, r2 increases, hence the threshold for inclusion goes up
rather than down. In other words, if inclusion of this variable as a covariate in the
model will increase the efficiency of an analysis, then it would have done so, and to
a slightly greater extent, had it not failed the balance test. This renders the balance
test uninformative when it comes to the selection of covariates.
To understand at a purely conceptual level why balance tests do not help in
selection of covariates, it is useful to think about why this particular variable has been
chosen for inclusion in the analysis to begin with. In the case of balance testing, a
variable is included strictly because of its significant relationship with the independent
variable. Thus when both variables are used simultaneously as predictors of the
dependent variable, some of the variance in the dependent variable that would have
been attributed to the experimental treatment will be attributed to the covariate
instead, just as collinear variables in observational data may fight over the same
variance in the dependent variable.
Whether this adjustment is helpful or harmful depends on the proportion of shifted
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attribution that is meaningless noise and is therefore a harmful correction. The more
collinearity between the covariate and the treatment variable, i.e., the more imbal-
ance, the more meaningless noise will show up in the adjustment to the estimate of
treatment effect. This means the portion of the variance in the dependent variable
predicted by the covariate must be higher in order for the helpful part of the adjust-
ment to outweigh the harmful part. If a variable was deemed insufficiently predictive
to include in the analysis before a balance test was done, then including it in the
analysis after a “failed” balance test cannot help and can, as we describe shortly,
undermine the integrity of the analysis.
The more general question of whether to include a given covariate is complicated
and we are not taking a position on this broader issue. Factors that go into this
include: prior knowledge of the relation of the covariates to the dependent variable,
whether maximal efficiency will be needed to obtain significance, desire to keep the
findings transparent and interpretable, or to give an assurance that the reported
significance is for a single analysis and not a large number of unreported analyses.
Our main result is comparative: “failed” randomization with respect to a covariate
should not lead a researcher to include that covariate in the model. If the researcher
plans to include a covariate for the sake of efficiency, it should be included in the
model regardless of the outcome of a balance test.
Post-stratification
If not as an aid in the selection of covariates, could balance test be useful in another
fashion? The term post-stratification has been used in the literature to refer to a
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collection of practices meant to enforce balance after the data has been collected.
The “strata” are typically subpopulations corresponding to different values of one
or more covariates. The classic work by Holt and Smith (1979) uses the term post-
stratification to mean re-weighting (see also Little 1993). The main use of weighting is
in extrapolating experimental results to the general population. However, weighting
can also be used to force the composition of treatment groups and control groups to
coincide. For example, if the treatment group has 27 males and 23 females while the
control group has 20 males and 30 females, weighting females more heavily in the
treatment group and weighting males more heavily in the control group can equalize
the compositions of the groups. If the design did not block on gender to begin with,
this is the next best way to force exact comparability of treatment and control groups
along the lines of gender. As a means of increasing efficiency, however, there is no
demonstrable gain. If one wishes one had blocked on gender from the start, then
inclusion of gender as a covariate is equally effective as post-stratifying on gender and
the results will be more transparent.
Post-stratification can refer more generally to any alteration of the analysis that
gets around imbalance of strata in treatment versus control groups. The logical
extreme is a subpopulation analysis, breaking the data set into groups depending on
the values of imbalanced covariates. Hansen and Bowers (2008, page 14), for instance,
suggest that “such imbalances can be remedied by post-stratification: if treatments
are on the whole older than controls, then compare older treatments only to older
controls, and also compare younger subjects only amongst themselves.”
Subpopulation analyses are often worth carrying out because of the possibility
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of heterogeneity across subpopulations in the size of the treatment effect. As with
covariates, however, subpopulation analyses should be carried out when there is an
underlying theoretical reason to do so, not because of a failed balance test. This
is not to say that there is anything wrong with running subgroup analyses or more
generally playing with one’s data. These practices can certainly lead to conceptual
advances, though what significance levels should be attached to data explorations is
not clear. What is clear is that this kind of post-hoc stratification is not a logical
or useful response to a failed balance test. Modulation of the treatment effect by
subpopulation membership is not in any way related to the balance or lack of balance
of the subpopulation over the random assignment.
Re-randomization
If balance tests are not useful toward informing covariate selection nor toward deciding
on a post-stratification analysis, they might still be useful in signaling when to re-
randomize. Re-randomizing in response to a failed balance test may or may not be
an option, depending on the type of experiment. If subjects arrive one at a time for
a laboratory experiment, and assignment to experimental condition is made on the
spot, a failed balance test will be evident only at the end when it is too late to start
the randomization afresh. If a given study allows randomization to be performed
ahead of time and the researcher has access in advance to the set of variables on
which balance is desired, then it is possible to check for balance before treatments
are administered and to re-do the randomization if the balance test fails. In other
words, if the researcher desires balance on, say, gender, race and party, then it is
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possible to generate a random assignment, test for significant imbalance on these
three variables, accept the randomization if all three are balanced, and if not, re-do
the randomization, possibly more than once, until balance is achieved on these three
variables.
Such a scheme of sampling with rejection is mathematically equivalent to gener-
ating a single randomization that is conditional on meeting certain criteria, such as
exact or approximate equality of treatment and control groups on specified variables.
Blocking, which is done in the design phase of an experiment, is the logical extreme of
rejection sampling (Imai et al., 2008). Blocking is an effective way of increasing effi-
ciency and “is almost always preferable whenever feasible” (Imai et al., 2008, p. 489).
Blocking is not feasible on more than a few variables, but if one only requires approx-
imate balance, then one might use a sampling scheme in which samples are rejected
until the desired degree of balance across conditions is achieved (see Lock 2011).
It is indeed possible to benefit from such an approach, but there are a number of
pitfalls as well. First, the reported significance level must be adjusted to take into ac-
count the precise rejection sampling scheme3. Secondly, one must often make do with
crudely approximated test statistic distributions and p-values determined by simula-
tions, because the mathematics of most rejection sampling schemes has not yet been
worked out. Unfortunately, it is common practice in some subfields to re-randomize
for balance without ever reporting that this has taken place. Significance levels are
reported as if this were the one and only randomization. Because the procedures to
3This is true even if the particular randomization was not rejected! This is because p-values are
a function of what might have happened as well as what did happen. This is one way in which
frequentist statistics is at odds with the likelihood principle.
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compute the correct significance levels for protocols with possible re-randomization
are not contained in any statistical package, most experimentalists make no effort to
take rejection into account when reporting significance levels. A promising avenue for
methodological research is the extent to which surrogate computations from standard
packages might be available.
Successful use of re-randomization supposes a pre-specified balance test. When
the rejection for imbalance is done in an ad hoc manner, e.g., by deciding after the
fact whether each unbalanced variable is important, it is not possible to resurrect
a valid significance statement. Provided the protocol for re-randomization is well
specified, there is still a question as to whether re-randomization is really the most
powerful design. An alternative is to include the variables that were to be balanced as
covariates from the start. Using covariates will often lead to less noise than rejection
sampling (Permutt, 1990). No randomization scheme has been shown to improve on
simply including the important covariates regardless of the outcome of a balance test.
Most importantly, as a practical matter, relatively few experimental designs allow
one to gather the necessary covariates from all subjects in advance and then check
balance before executing the experiment.
Hazards of Responding to Balance Tests
Thus far, our case against balance tests is that there is no sound reason to do them,
and no valid response once one has failed. But is there a reason not to do them? After
all, when a manuscript referee asks for a balance test, it is expedient to comply, and
15
absent any harmful fallout, a researcher would be tempted to “just do it”. Potential
losses in efficiency due to inclusion of useless covariates are often quite small and the
balance test is likely to be negative anyway, so the potential harm appears negligible.
There is, however, a price to pay, manifested in several ways. Leaving aside
the question of which balance test to do (there is little agreement) and how many
and which variables to test, there are several hazards. These hazards, which do
not affect analyses based on straightforward comparisons of means, include 1) model
mis-specification, 2) the perceived credibility of the results, and 3) more complex
calculations of significance levels.
Model mis-specification is perhaps the most significant drawback of the use of
covariates in general. Multiple regression and analysis of covariance are less robust
against model mis-specification than is bivariate linear regression or analysis of vari-
ance. Stunningly, this fact appears to be overlooked by the majority of experimental
researchers in the social sciences. To elaborate, in the experimental setting, bivari-
ate linear regression (or analysis of variance) always produces a valid estimate of the
treatment effect and a valid confidence test for nonzero treatment effect. The only
necessary assumption is that the randomization was as advertised, that is, produced
by a valid source of randomness. Multivariate models, on the other hand, involve
explicit assumptions about dependence between variables. Each variable is assumed
to contribute to the dependent variable in a linear manner, and the effects of different
covariates are assumed to be additive. One can add extra variables, such as squares or
products, that correct for nonlinearities or non-additive interactions, but the required
assumptions of linearity and additivity persist in the enlarged set of variables. When
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these assumptions are violated, estimates produced by multivariate models are biased
and inferences and confidence statements become invalid. (A brief example is noted
by Freedman 2008, Example 5.)
Using covariates with experimental data is tempting because this may produce
a more accurate estimate of a treatment effect or a more sensitive test for differing
means. Indeed, its use when one believes a handful of covariates will have strong
and more or less linear effects on the dependent variable often allows identification of
effects that would otherwise remain hidden. But these statistical models may also be
invalidated by problems that cannot arise in a simpler model. Green (2009) argues
that the biases and inaccuracies are often small. There is some evidence that a simple
multivariate model involving one treatment and one control condition, with a single
covariate and data that are not obviously bimodal, will not be off by too much. The
reader is left to judge whether an analysis that is likely just a little wrong is better
than one that is demonstrably right. To date nothing is known about the extent of risk
due to mis-specification for the most common approach to analyzing political science
experiments, namely large multiple regression equations involving many covariates,
combined with complex, multi-factor experimental treatments.
The second potential hazard of “just doing it” is the lack of transparency in the
presentation and interpretation of findings. In a simple linear regression, it is quite
clear what is being estimated and why the estimate is what it is; the only independent
variables are the ones representing experimental conditions. In a multiple regression,
one estimates the net effect of treatment minus a linear function of the covariates, this
function itself depending on an estimate of some coefficients in an equation assumed
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to be linear. While the estimate produced by this process could possibly be more
accurate, our relative unease with the practice rests on a very real narrowing of the
validity of the model. Balance tests, to the extent that they result in models with
extra assumptions, work against transparency and credibility, not in favor of them.
Ironically, many reviewers respond to models that include more covariates as if
they were inherently more robust than models without covariates. This is demonstra-
bly not the case. This mistake on the part of reviewers stems from a misunderstanding
of how experiments work. The sheer fact that covariates in experiments are often re-
ferred to as “controls” reveals the nature of this misunderstanding. Whereas more
control variables in an observational analysis might strengthen confidence that an
association is not spurious, in experiments the presence of covariates should lead to
greater scrutiny.
A second issue concerning transparency occurs when the model is altered based
on analyses involving the dependent variable. Statistical inference is never valid
conditional on post-treatment measures, meaning that one cannot alter the model
based on any analyses of the dependent variable. A researcher cannot, for example,
decide to include a covariate because it is a good predictor of the dependent variable
in the present data set. Limited inference may still be available in this case, but it is
very weak and the rigorous framework for such inference is in its infancy (Berk et al.,
2010).
Because this is well known, analyses conditioned on the dependent variable are
never presented as such. However, when an article is submitted for publication, it is
not usually possible to tell precisely how the model was chosen. Some studies, such as
18
FDA drug trials, require an advance specification of design and analysis. This prac-
tice is not the norm in social science research. Therefore, to avoid the appearance of
so-called data snooping, it is incumbent on the researcher to choose a model that is
readily identified as the natural model for the dependent variable in question. Covari-
ates should be selected because previous research or theoretical reasoning indicates
an expected relation with the dependent variable. Short of advance specification,
this is the surest way to avoid the appearance of having chosen the model based on
post-treatment data.
A related problem with credibility occurs when multiple analyses of the exper-
imental hypothesis are performed or might have been performed. Running many
analyses, each with a different selection of covariates, and then reporting the most
significant one is a form of choosing the model based on post-treatment measures. In
the worst case, running k different analyses distorts the p-value by a factor of k. This
would be true if the analyses were all independent. Because they are not independent,
the actual factor is much less than k. Because of this, or perhaps because the ac-
tual correction to the p-value is unknown, the practice of suppressing inconsequential
analyses and using the single-analysis p-value as if it were correct is commonplace.
This practice always errs in the direction of over-reporting significance. Solutions
that have been advocated include automated model selection, a partition of the data
into a half that informs model selection and a half on which the final analysis is per-
formed, and adherence to parsimonious models that do not have the complexity to
be the result of a fishing expedition, at least not a large one (see, e.g., Tsiatis et al.
2007).
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The final issue concerning inaccurate reporting of significance is subtle. Signif-
icance levels for sequential analyses are not equal to the significance level for the
resulting simple analysis. For example, suppose the researcher decides to run an
analysis with or without a covariate X depending on the distribution of that variable
across treatment and control groups. If p1 is the p-value for the analysis for the simple
test that always excludes X and p2 is the p-value for the test that always includes
X as a covariate, then the significance level of the two-stage analysis – that is, first
running the balance test, then running the analysis with or without the covariate,
as dictated by the balance test – is not given by p1 if X is excluded and p2 if X is
included. In fact, as demonstrated for a single-covariate multivariate normal model
by Permutt (1990), the resulting significance can be less than either p1 or p2. Statis-
tical software is not set up to compute significance in this kind of sequential analysis.
This leads to errors in confidence levels, again in the direction of inflated significance.
Compromises have been proposed such as reporting the result of a balance test
but not using the result to alter the analysis. But then it is extermely puzzling for
the reader to understand why it is included. If it is not relevant to the model choice,
the credibility of the findings or to the efficiency of the model, then why do it?
When a researcher initiates balance testing, he or she should understand the
purpose of doing so and be prepared to live with the consequences. If a balance
test results in doubt as to whether randomization was carried out properly, then the
problem cannot be fixed by adding covariates to the analysis. At best some inference
might be salvaged by re-analyzing the data as an observational study.
In practice, it is clear from what usually happens after a failed balance test that
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the randomization procedure itself is not being deemed faulty by the author or the
reviewers. Once an analysis has gone to peer review, we have seldom if ever seen
a failed balance test lead to the response that the data will no longer be treated as
experimental data, as would have to be the case if the randomization were believed
to be flawed. Either the cases were randomly assigned or they were not; there is no
middle ground.
Although the central point of this paper is statistical rather than historical, upon
reaching our conclusions we found ourselves puzzled as to the origins of this practice.
If the inclusion of variables as covariates based on failed randomization tests is not
useful toward increasing the credibility of the findings nor the efficiency of the analy-
sis, except in the contexts we have outlined, then a natural question to ask is why this
has become such standard practice. We can find no one source that explicitly recom-
mends this practice or documents its utility, thus we can only speculate as to its likely
origins. To be clear, a number of sources appear to advocate balance tests for ran-
domized experiments, but either they do so for general reasons (e.g., asserting greater
credibility without justification), or upon closer inspection the recommendation is
limited to situations falling outside the scope of the fully randomized experiments
considered here.
One possibility is that it stems from a lack of faith in or thorough understanding of
probability theory. A related possibility is confusion between frequentist and Bayesian
paradigms. It seems intuitive to adopt the (Bayesian) likelihood principle, using a
second look at the data to refine (frequentist) statements of significance. Attempts
have been made to blend these two frameworks: first (as a frequentist) check whether
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the findings are significant at say a p < 0.05 level, and second (as a Bayesian) if they
are, bolster our confidence by assessing further the likelihood that the confounding
random event of probability less than 0.05 has, in fact, occurred. Unfortunately,
to date, no rigorous statistical practice along these lines improves upon traditional
significance computations.
A second possibility is that this practice results from mistakenly applying methods
for observational analyses to experimental results. Researchers new to experimental
analysis often try to extend methods from a more familiar setting, namely that of
observational survey data. These two methods require different analysis practices.
Nonetheless, authors of experimental studies are often encouraged to run multivari-
ate regressions including “control” variables such as a laundry list of demographic
characteristics. The very notion of a “control” variable makes no sense in the context
of an experiment.
The rise of large-N population-based survey experiments further complicates mat-
ters, as researchers have what is essentially hybrid data to analyze, often including
hundreds of potential variables on which experimental conditions might be unbal-
anced. Such approaches encourage further confusion regarding best practices for
analysis. In practice, most such studies should be analyzed as experiments (see Mutz
2011).
Yet another possibility is that the popularity of this practice comes from the field
experimental literature in which treatment cannot always be controlled as well as it
can be in purely experimental studies. As we describe when setting the parameters for
our argument, balance tests may be useful if characteristics of individuals influence
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their likelihood of experiencing treatment, or when differential attrition may occur
based on individual characteristics.
Whatever the origins of this practice, researchers today overuse balance tests to
achieve ends that these tests are not capable of accomplishing. The conclusion for
our purposes is that the integrity of one’s findings is increased by choosing covariates
(or randomization schemes, stratification of population, etc.) according to a scheme
that is specified in advance and parsimonious. Throwing in more covariates because
they “can’t hurt”, aside from losing efficiency to a small degree, sacrifices integrity in
the eyes of readers and reviewers, as well as intrinsic accuracy and validity.
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